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We test the relationship between size of regional trade agreement (RTA) and regional 
trade bias using a gravity equation on a large sample of 143 countries for the period 
1980-2003. We find that regional trade bias declines with the size of the club and that 
three of the four expanding RTAs have already surpassed their ‘optimal’ sizes. There 
is no evidence that RTAs have set protection levels against outsiders non-
cooperatively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
RTAs have been a prominent feature of the world economy since the creation of the 
European Economic Community in the late 1950s. Two aspects of this feature are 
worth noting. The first is the rapid growth and complexity of these arrangements, 
although quite a few of them are bilateral agreements of small consequence for 
international trade (Pomfret, 2006, p.42). The second is that several plurilateral RTAs 
--in Europe, North America, Central America, and South East Asia-- have expanded 
in size and economic importance. The RTA phenomenon has sparked a growing 
literature on the role of RTAs in the international trade system (Panagariya, 2000). 
Our paper intends to address empirically that part of the literature dealing with the 
relationship between RTA size and regional trade bias and the potential that it may 
have on trade diversion against outsiders. Our research strategy is to estimate the 
effects of regional trade bias and external protectionism on bilateral trade flows using 
the gravity equation (1): 
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where xijt= the real bilateral trade between country i and country j at time t, y= real 
gross domestic product, I= real per capita income, d= distance, FEAT= a vector of 
dummy variables that capture idiosyncratic country characteristics, RTA= dummy 
variables to indicate if two trading partners belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, InterRTA= a dummy variable to indicate if two countries belong to 
different RTA, and uijt=  error term. The vector of dummy variables in FEAT includes 
year dummy variables and time-invariant factors such as common language, common 
colonizer, shared land border, and common money; see Fratianni and Kang (2006). 
The gravity equation has been derived from different models of international trade   3
(Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998 among others) and used extensively empirically 
(see, for example, Frankel et al., 1998; Rose, 2000; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 
2003). 
  Our data set consist of 215,500 annual real bilateral trade flows over the period 
1980 to 2003. The dataset and data description are available from the Indiana 
University CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm). We 
identify eleven separate RTAs accounting for 40 percent of world trade: ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations), CARICOM (Caribbean Community and 
Common Market), EU (European Union), NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), ANDEAN (Andean Community of Nations), CACM (Central American 
Common Market), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), PATCRA (Papua New 
Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement), ANZCERTA (the 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement), SPARTECA 
(South Pacific Region Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement), and USIS (the 
United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement). The first four of the 11 RTAs have 
expanded since 1980. 
  The literature generates different implications on the sign and size of β1 and β2. 
A trade-diverting RTA implies β1> 0 and β2< 0.  As RTAs expand, assuming that 
external tariffs are set non-cooperatively, some of the trade occurring between blocs is 
diverted to trade inside the blocs (Krugman, 1991); this implies that β1 becomes more 
positive and β2 more negative. If external tariffs are set cooperatively, instead, both β1 
and β2 can be positive (Krugman, 1993); and the sum of the two coefficients can be 
rising as a result of a generalized fall in protectionism.  In other papers, the size of the 
RTA is determined endogenously. For example, in both Bond and Syropoulos (1996) 
and Andriamananjara (1999), the optimal expansion of an RTA occurs short of   4
encompassing all countries in the world. In Bond and Syropoulos, the expansion is 
driven by the insiders’ welfare level and in Andriamananjara by the insider-firms’ 
profits. Assuming that trade can proxy for welfare or profits, these models predict an 
inverted U-shaped β1 in RTA size and a declining β2. 
 
2. Findings 
OLS estimates of (1), with fixed-year effects, are reported in Table 1. Virtually all 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. Real 
imports respond positively to real GDP (with a unit elasticity), common border, 
shared culture (such as language and colonial relationship), and common institutions 
(such as currency); and negatively to distance. These results are in line with those 
reported by the literature. For the rest of the paper, we concentrate on the estimates of 
β1   and β2. 
Table 1  
  The first column of the table shows that positive regional trade bias is present 
in five of the seven non-expanding RTAs: ANZCERTA and PATCRA have a 
negative regional trade bias. Different patterns emerge in the four expanding RTAs. 
For ASEAN and CARICOM, the regional trade bias is positive but declining. The 
decline for ASEAN occurs when the members go from nine to ten; for CARICOM 
from 13 to 14. NAFTA has a negative regional bias when the membership is restricted 
to Canada and the United States, but then the bias becomes positive with the addition 
of Mexico. For the EU, the bias starts negatively and then peaks in the positive range 
with ten members. Thus, in three of the four expanding RTAs, the evidence is 
consistent with the club being too big, as seen from the viewpoint of the incumbents. 
NAFTA has potential for further expansion.   5
  The second column of the table breaks down the regional trade between old 
and new members of the club; the table reports the results only for the EU. In the 
EU10, the regional trade bias among the old nine members, conditional on the 10
th 
member (Greece), translates into 13 percent more trade than not being in the club 
(exp(0.1224)=1.13). The entry of Greece adds 37 percent more trade 
(exp(0.3184)=1.37) between Greece and the old members relative to not being in the 
club. Since the interaction among old members represents 80 percent of the 
observations, while the interaction between old members and Greece account for 20 
percent of the observations, we obtain that the total regional trade bias in the EU10 is 
approximately 18 percent. Similar reasoning applies to EU12 and EU15. Portugal and 
Spain add a positive regional trade bias in their interaction with the old ten members, 
but this bias is compensated by an opposite bias of the old members interacting among 
themselves and of Portugal interacting with Spain. Austria, Finland, and Sweden also 
add a positive regional trade bias in their interaction with the old 12 members and 
with one another, but this bias is compensated by the negative bias of  the old 12 
members interacting among themselves. In sum, as the club expands old members lose 
some of the positive regional trade bias to new members. The total bias depends on 
these opposing forces: the size of β1 peaks at EU10.   
  The migration of positive regional trade bias from old to new members holds 
also for ASEAN and CARICOM; the estimation is not shown but is available upon 
request. In ASEAN10, the regional trade bias among the old nine members, 
conditional on the 10
th member (Cambodia), is 241 percent and is approximately half 
of the bias without Cambodia. The entry of the latter into the club adds a 230 percent 
regional bias but its weight in the club is very small. The result is a sharp reduction in 
the overall trade bias of ASEAN10 with respect to ASEAN9. Similarly, in   6
CARICOM14, the 13 old members, conditional on the 14
th member (Haiti), 
experience a sharp reduction in the regional bias relative to CARICOM 13; the 
marginal impact on the club’s trade bias of Haiti, furthermore, is statistically not 
different from zero. Consequently, the total regional bias falls in CARICOM14 
relative to CARICOM13. 
  The positive and statistically significant estimate of β2 is consistent with the 
hypothesis that RTAs set external tariffs cooperatively. GATT, the WTO, and 
multilateral rounds have played a role in the global reduction of tariff rates and non-
tariff barriers. This result is not consistent with the view that RTAs are stumbling 




We have tested the relationship between RTA size and regional trade bias using a 
gravity equation on a large sample of 143 countries for the period 1980-2003. The 
critical result is that regional trade bias declines with the size of the club. Seen from 
the perspective of the incumbents, three of the four expanding RTAs have already 
surpassed their ‘optimal’ size. This could result not only from strategic trade 
considerations, but also from the rising cost of decision-making as the club expands. 
We have also evidence that RTAs have set protection levels against non-members 
cooperatively rather than non-cooperatively.   7
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Table 1: The expansion of RTAs and International Trade, 1980-2003 
 





Intercept -27.9238   -27.9272
Log of real expenditure 0.8941   0.8943
Log of real per capita exp. 0.1211  0.1210
Log of distance -1.0449  -1.0453
Common border 0.4608  0.4637
Common language 0.3404  0.3404
Common colonizer 0.7457  0.7456
Colonial relationship 1.4067  1.4067 
Common currency 0.5004  0.5025
InterRTA 0.2425 0.2425
ANDEAN 0.9007 0.8987
ANZCERTA -1.4888   -1.4895
CACM 1.9923   1.9902
MERCOSUR 0.9500   0.9469
PATCRA -1.5986 -1.5991
SPARTECA 3.8335   3.8338
USIS 1.3274   1.3268
ASEAN6(1968-1995) 2.1635   2.1623
ASEAN7(1996-1997) 2.2888 2.2875 
ASEAN9(1998) 2.0187 2.0175













EU10: within EU9(1981-1985)   0.1224
EU10: EU9 & Greece(1981-1985)   0.3184
EU12: within EU10(1986-1994)   -0.0482
*
EU12: EU10 & [Portugal, Spain](1986-1994)   0.1616 
EU12: within Portugal and Spain(1986-1994)   -0.3191 
EU15: Within EU12(1995-2003)   -0.1122
EU15: EU12 & [Austria, Sweden, Finland](1995-2003)   0.1384 




2  0.6139 0.6139
Notes:  Years of expansion of the RTAs are obtained from the websites of  the RTAs and of the WTO. 
“EU10: within EU9” refers to bilateral flows among the old nine EU members; “EU10: EU9 & 
Greece” refers to bilateral flows between each of the nine old members and Greece. Similar reasoning 
applies to further expansions of the EU.  All coefficients are significant at the 1% level, unless noted 
otherwise.  
* indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient is 
not significant at 10% level. All models include fixed-year effects, which are not reported.    